Gail A.Van Norman, M.D.
Assistant Professor of Anesthesiology
University of Washington, Box 356540
Seattle, WA 98195-6540
gvn@u.washington.edu
Introduction
Geriatric patients face special medical, economic and social
challenges that affect the ethical and legal issues in their
medical care. Ethical principles guiding the care of elderly
patients are no different from those involved in the care of
other adult patient populations. Common ethical challenges include
conflicts over patient autonomy and choice, surrogate decision-making
and do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order in the operating room.
Respecting Patient Autonomy
The ethical principle of respect for patient autonomy requires
that medical decisions be made by the patient, whose life is
directly and most affected by the consequences of the decision.
Physicians can provide information, recommendations and rational
argument to convince a patient to agree to medical therapies,
but the ultimate decision of what will be done to them rests
with the patient. The legal doctrine embodying this principle
is that of informed consent and has been upheld in U.S. courts
since 1914. 1,2
Informed Consent
Informed consent requires several elements. First, consent
must be voluntary and free of undue influence or coercion. Second,
consent must be made based on sufficient information. Finally,
the decision-maker must be able to understand the information
given to them, apply it in some rational way to the medical
issue at hand and arrive at a decision based in part on the
information given to them.3 Patients
have the right to refuse medical therapy, even if the decision
is at odds with what the physician feels "is best" for them.4
Voluntary decisions, by definition, must be free of
force, intimidation, duress or coercion. Social and economic
pressures affecting elderly patients may hinder the ability
of elderly patients to make truly voluntary choices. Pressures
from family members to undertake, or not undertake medically
onerous treatments can cause an elderly patient considerable
duress. Economic pressures on patients with limited monetary
resources may play a hidden albeit significant role in the patientās
decisions. Fears of dependency or of burdening the family may
encourage some patients to forgo treatment that might otherwise
be beneficial. These influences affect any patient population,
but geriatric patients are particularly likely to face such
pressures while suffering from medical conditions that require
difficult treatment decisions.
A patient must have sufficient information to give informed
consent. In the "reasonable person" standard, used in about
half of the United States, the physician must provide information
that any "reasonable person" would need.1
About half of the United States apply an "individual" standard,
recognizing that some individuals may have special informational
requirements. In general, patients should be told in lay terms
the diagnosis to be treated, the proposed treatment, the foreseeable
risks and benefits of the procedure and the viable alternatives
to the procedure, including no treatment.5
Anesthesiologists should pay particular attention to explaining
the risks of common problems that generally do not have significant
long-term impact (e.g., nausea, sore throat, delirium) as well
as rare problems that have significant long-term impact (e.g.,
death, neurologic injury, myocardial ischemia or infarction).6
"Competency," is a legal term describing a patientās
ability to perform certain functions. Medical authors often
refer to the ability of a patient to make medical decisions
as "capacity" to distinguish it from the related legal term.7
Capacity is a relative, not an all-or-none, phenomenon. Incapacity
to handle finances, for example, does not preclude capacity
to make personal decisions about medical care.8,9
Capacity can wax and wane with environmental factors, such as
time of day, familiarity of surroundings, the presence of distractions
and reactions to medications. Decision-making capacity can be
impaired by medical conditions that afflict elderly patients,
such as dementia, cerebrovascular accidents and depression.
Physical impediments to communication that are more common in
elderly patients, such as aphasia and hearing loss, can give
the false appearance of impaired capacity when no impairment
exists.
Determining that an elderly patient has the capacity to
make medical decisions can be a challenge for the anesthesiologist,
who is often a stranger to the patient, and has limited time
and resources for making what can sometimes be complex determinations.
Many patients who carry the diagnosis of dementia have sufficient
abilities to make medical decisions, yet studies demonstrate
that patients with dementia are likely to be referred for competency
evaluations when they disagree with their physician, and are
unlikely to be referred if they agree.10
When decisions are required regarding resuscitation in ICU patients,
there is evidence that many physicians will not have discussed
DNR decisions with competent patients either before or during
the ICU stay.11,12
Assumptions about patient capacity based on diagnosis categories
or age is not consistent with ethical medical care. Determination
of decision-making capacity should focus on the patientās functional
capacity. Basic questions to ask include:
1. Can the patient receive and understand information
relevant to the decision at hand?
2. Can the patient understand possible consequences of
their choice and alternatives, including risks and benefits?
3. Can the patient make and express a decision and discuss
his/her values and desires in relationship to the medical
advice provided?
Some patients are clearly too impaired to make medical decisions,
but when questions arise, expert consultation can be helpful,
both in determining a patientās capacity to make decisions and
in overcoming physical barriers to communication. Consent in
impaired patients may required extra time, patience and effort,
but anesthesiologists are ethically obliged to promote and respect
the autonomy of patients in making medical choices.
Surrogate Decision-Making
When patients are too impaired to make medical choices, a surrogate
decision-maker may be involved. Proxy decision-making is based
on three assumptions:
1. That a competent patientās decisions can be implemented
by proxy.
2. That the proxy will make the same decision that the patient
themselves would make if they were competent (the proxy would
"don the mantle" of the patient).
3. That, in the absence of proxies, doctors might act less
out of interest for the patient than out of fear of litigation.
Usually doctors turn to family members, assuming that families
have the patientās best interests at heart and, by virtue of
coming from a common cultural background, are more likely to
actually know what the patient would decide.13
But studies have shown that family proxy decision makers often
come no closer than chance alone at predicting what a family
member would want under hypothetical circumstances, and that
proxies and patients infrequently discuss issues and values
surrounding the use and withdrawal of life-sustaining technologies.14,15
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that physicians are incorrect
in predicting resuscitation preferences in 25 percent of their
patients.16 Proxy decision-making
is a poor substitute for patient decision-making and should
be avoided unless the patient is truly unable to participate
in decisions.
Mechanisms for proxy decision-making include living wills,
durable power of attorney or legal hierarchies. Living wills
(advanced directives) are documents of a competent patientās
wishes, executed in front of qualified witness, which can then
be used on occasions when a patient is no longer competent to
guide medical decision-making. A durable power of attorney is
a mechanism for the competent patient to designate a specific
person as their proxy for medical decision-making should they
later become incompetent. Each state has a legal hierarchy through
which a medical decision-maker is appointed if the patient has
not executed a living will or durable power of attorney. Sometimes
the court may appoint a legal guardian apart from family or
other surrogate decision-makers who is legally responsible for
health care decisions for the patient.
Do Not Attempt Resuscitation Orders (DNR)
Any adult with decision-making capacity has the right to refuse
specific medical interventions, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation,
even in the operating room.
Studies have shown that DNR orders are frequently entered in
patient charts without a discussion with the patient and informed
consent, even if the patient is competent to participate
in such a discussion.17 Physicians
often turn to surrogate decision-makers and leave competent
patients out of the decision-making process if the patient is
elderly or carries the diagnosis of dementia. Paternalism (the
doctor "knows" what is best), a desire to promote good and do
no harm (the discussion might stress, and therefore harm, the
patient) or more selfish motivations (the doctors wants to avoid
a discussion that may be distressing to them) have been used
as rationale to avoid having difficult conversations that are
nevertheless ethically required.
The implications of cardiac arrest under anesthesia differ
from those for arrest in other areas of the hospital; over 60
percent of patients resuscitated in the OR survive to discharge
versus 7-17 percent of patients on the ward. 18,19
This is probably because OR arrests are witnessed, receive
immediate intervention, and usually occur from reversible causes--medication
effects and hemorrhage, while arrests on the ward may go unwitnessed
for varying lengths of time and are often related to the severity
of the underlying disease process.
Cardiac arrests, resuscitations and outcomes are different
between the ward and the operating room, but the moral principles
governing conduct with respect to patient autonomy are the same.
As with other medical interventions, patients must be given
appropriate information and provide informed consent (or "informed
refusal) for cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the operating
room. Because some procedures commonly thought of as resuscitation
(e.g., mechanical ventilation) may be required for the anesthetic
care of the patient, the anesthesiologist should discuss the
ways in which resuscitation can practically be limited in the
OR and still permit reasonable anesthetic care to proceed.
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