| mbulatory
surgical centers (ASCs) can be a mixed blessing
for anesthesiology practices: At the same time that
they often present better payer mixes than inpatient
facilities and, in some instances, investment opportunities
not available in the nonprofit hospital context,
they do not always offer the efficiencies or volume
that commonly are associated with ASC operations.
This article will explore differences between working
in the inpatient and the ASC settings, some of the
difficulties and practical issues inherent in ASC
practice and legal considerations related to ASC
investments.
Differences from the inpatient setting.
A variety of factors distinguish the ambulatory
arena from the inpatient setting, and anesthesiology
practices considering covering an ASC should consider
these differences.
a. Emphasis on efficiency. Physician investors
in ASCs often want cases to be moved quickly so
that they can minimize downtime between cases. While
efficiency is a concern in the hospital setting
as well, efficiency issues can play out differently
in the ASC context. Physician investors typically
want to restrict coverage to anesthesiologists who
work quickly. They also want anesthesiologists who
have the ability to motivate ASC staff to assist
in turning rooms over quickly.
At the same time, however, physician investors sometimes
try to skimp on ASC staff and to have anesthesiologists
perform tasks more commonly performed by anesthesiology
technicians, such as cleaning up work areas and
inspecting anesthesia equipment. Anesthesiologists
should understand how the ASC intends to operate
and make sure that contractual agreements for anesthesiology
services address the parties’ expectations
on ASC staffing.
b. Request for a core group of anesthesiologists.
ASCs typically request that an anesthesiology practice
assign a core group of anesthesiologists and nurse
anesthetists (in the case of a care team practice)
to an ASC to provide for continuity and efficiency.
The perception is that when new anesthesiologists
and nurse anesthetists rotate through an ASC, their
unfamiliarity with the ASC day-to-day operations
(e.g., where supplies and equipment are stored)
may slow down their ability to provide services
efficiently. On a practical level, physicians practicing
at an ASC do not want a constant change in the anesthesiology
personnel practicing at an ASC. From an anesthesiology
group’s perspective, it is important to understand
the ASC’s expectations and to assess how they
fit into the group’s practice. Do anesthesiology
group members want to rotate through the ASC, both
for the change in pace from inpatient practice and
also to maintain the roster of individuals available
to take call? These issues need to be addressed
in the ASC services agreement to avoid later disagreement.
c. Profit motivation. Physician investors
in ASCs sometimes want a “share of the profit”
associated with providing anesthesiology services
at the ASC. This desire raises concerns regarding
illegal kickbacks in order to secure the agreement
to provide anesthesiology services at the ASC. It
is permissible for ASCs to employ anesthesiologists,
if the relationship is a true employment relationship.
It is not permissible for an ASC to charge a fee,
directly or indirectly, in order for an anesthesiology
practice to provide services at an ASC. Proposals
or demands for unusual payments or services, such
as providing personnel typically hired by the facility
or paying a franchise fee, should be carefully scrutinized
for legality. See discussion below regarding the
antikickback law.
d. Surgeon expectations. In the ASC setting,
there is no buffer between anesthesiologists and
surgeons and other physicians performing procedures.
Typically physicians who have an ownership interest
in the ASC will determine who will provide anesthesiology
services there. In the hospital setting, administration
can serve a valuable role by functioning as an independent
third party in resolving surgeon requests for coverage.
Administrators may be receptive to surgeon requests
and complaints, but hospital action on a particular
request will depend upon the financial impact to
the hospital of granting the request. In a physician-owned
ASC, the ASC’s reaction may depend upon the
level of the surgeon’s investment in and control
over the ASC.
e. Patient expectations. Patients sometimes
expect more in the ASC setting than in the hospital
context. They expect to be able to go home relatively
quickly and not to experience postoperative nausea
and vomiting, and they often anticipate that they
will be free of pain. Patients also expect to be
able to return to work quickly. These expectations
need to be addressed directly to avoid misunderstanding
and complaints and thereby to improve patient satisfaction.
f. Need to screen cases. Surgeons and other
physicians increasingly try to perform more invasive
procedures on sicker patients in the ASC setting.
The possible reasons for this trend may include
the perception that anesthesia is safer and there
is less risk in performing a wide range of cases
in ASCs, the inability to secure block time in an
inpatient setting or the potential for financial
return if the physician has an ownership interest
in an ASC. Whatever the reason, anesthesiologists
need to review scheduled ASC procedures and the
patients’ medical conditions carefully in
advance in order to confirm whether or not the procedures
and the patients belong in an ASC rather than an
inpatient facility.
Evaluating an ASC opportunity. ASCs often
are attractive to anesthesiology practices, typically
offering better payer mixes than inpatient facilities;
but does an ASC opportunity offer a boon or a bust?
The following discussion will offer some areas for
exploration.
a. Surgeon investment. A common assumption
is that surgeons and other physician investors will
bring a high volume of cases to ASCs in which they
have an investment. But in how many ASCs do they
have ownership interests? Some anesthesiologists
have discovered that physicians in their market
have ownership interests in multiple ASCs and shift
their business from one ASC to another for a variety
of reasons. This unanticipated movement of cases
can leave empty operating rooms behind, leading
to operating room inefficiencies more commonly associated
with the hospital inpatient setting.
b. Agreements with payers. In some markets
with heavy concentrations of ASCs and office-based
surgery, payers have determined that there are too
many ASCs, and they contract with only some of the
available ASCs. Those ASCs that do not have contracts
with key payers may not be able to fill their operating
rooms, despite physician investment in the ASCs.
The impact can be particularly pronounced when a
payer changes its contracting patterns and decides
to cut an existing ASC from its network of approved
facilities. While not every market will have this
problem now, this problem can develop as more ASCs
are developed.
c. Assess the ASC business model and administration.
Does the ASC have a business plan? How many investors
does it have? Where is it located in relation to
the population growth and competing facilities in
the community? Does the ASC have professional administrative
staff who have ASC experience? Is a national ASC
development company involved in managing the ASC?
The experience of the ASC administrative team may
well determine the ASC’s ability to survive
over the long term. These questions may be wise
ones to ask, particularly if the ASC seems to cater
to its investors without regard to the cost to the
facility.
Staffing the ASC. Deciding which
anesthesiologists (and nurse anesthetists, if your
group employs them) in your practice should be assigned
to an ASC involves consideration of a variety of
factors. For many groups, the days of simply assigning
senior anesthesiologists in a practice, or those
anesthesiologists who no longer take call, to staff
an ASC have passed.
a. Need for interpersonal skills. An ASC
is not the place to assign your problematic physician
who has anger management issues or who does not
like one of the physician investors. An ASC is typically
a smaller facility where all who practice there
are likely to interact. It is not uncommon for ASC
owners to request that only specific anesthesiologists
or nurse anesthetists in a practice work at an ASC.
An anesthesiology group needs to assess its physician
and nonphysician staff objectively to determine
who is best suited to work at the ASC.
b. Lack of inpatient resources. Another
consideration in deciding which anesthesiologists
and nurse anesthetists will work best in the ambulatory
setting is the solo nature of the practice in an
ASC. Unlike an inpatient facility, anesthesiologists
working in an ASC frequently will have few colleagues
or resources present to assist in the event that
a patient has unanticipated problems. For those
groups that assign one anesthesiologist and two
to three nurse anesthetists to an ASC on a daily
basis, this concern is particularly acute. In contrast,
in a hospital, a fellow anesthesiologist often will
be available to assist on difficult cases or to
take over medical direction of other concurrent
cases if one case requires exclusive attention.
c. Subspecialty expertise. The ASC may
request subspecialty expertise as a condition to
awarding a contract to an anesthesiology practice.
For example ASCs anticipating a high volume of pediatric
cases may request pediatric anesthesiology expertise.
The ASC’s staffing requirements may change
the anesthesiology group’s plans for staffing
the ASC.
Contract issues. Contracts with
ASCs to provide anesthesiology services are similar
to anesthesiology services agreements with hospitals,
but there are significant differences in several
provisions.
a. ASC-specific contract issues. ASC agreements
often include a provision to provide a medical director
for the ASC. Depending upon the amount of time the
medical director devotes to administrative services
on behalf of the ASC, the ASC may need to compensate
the anesthesiology practice for the nonclinical
time the medical director devotes to these responsibilities.
Another issue unique to the ASC setting is the obligation,
often placed on the anesthesiology group, to remain
in the ASC until the last patient is discharged.
This obligation can be particularly burdensome if
the anesthesiology group did not provide services
to the patient or in the case of a 23-hour-stay
patient. The parties should have clear agreement
on these points to avoid later disagreements.
b. Dealing with low volume or scheduling inefficiencies.
Stipends for coverage of low-volume or inefficiently
scheduled operating rooms are not limited to the
hospital setting. Contract negotiations for ASC
coverage also can include a compensation component
to counterbalance costly coverage requirements.
These situations may occur in the case of new ASCs
or existing ASCs that want to offer operating room
time to physicians but do not have the volume to
fill those operating rooms. Compensation also may
be appropriate if the ASC allows inefficiencies
in scheduling, as may occur in the case of a surgeon
who wants maximum efficiency in the form of back-to-back
scheduling with the ability to move directly from
one operating room to the next. This coverage can
result in additional anesthesiology staffing. Some
ASCs take the position that they will not pay for
“downtime,” which can leave an anesthesiology
practice in a difficult position: assume the risk
of financial loss due to anticipated inefficiencies
or lose the contract to provide anesthesiology services
at the ASC. Loss of the contract can result in loss
of a valuable opportunity to maintain a practice’s
financial soundness, as the better-paying cases
migrate to the ASC from the inpatient or day surgery
unit of a hospital. If an anesthesiology practice
has concerns about inefficiencies in an ASC and
it is unable to negotiate compensation to offset
its losses, it should make sure that it has the
ability to terminate the agreement if providing
the mandated coverage becomes too costly.
c. Requests for proposal (RFPs). It is
not uncommon for ASCs to issue RFPs to select an
anesthesiology practice, particularly in the case
of new ASCs. An RFP also may be a response to a
difficult negotiation. In markets where multiple
proposals are anticipated, an anesthesiology group
submitting a proposal may conclude that it needs
to compromise on some of the contractual issues
addressed above or face the risk of losing the contract.
Legal aspects of ASC investments. Anesthesiologists,
like other physicians, frequently wish to invest
in ASCs. Since physicians can drive the demand for
their own services, at least in the view of health
economists and legislators, several well-known statutes
limit the ability of doctors to be paid for referring
patients.
a. Stark II. First is the federal physician
self-referral law known as the Stark law for its
Congressman progenitor Fortney H. “Pete”
Stark (D-Calif.). The Stark law and regulations
prohibit physicians from referring patients for
any of 11 “Designated Health Services”
(DHS) to a hospital, ASC or any other “entity”
with which they have a financial relationship. Those
DHSs do not include physicians’ professional
services or services included in the ASC facility
fee. Rather they include such items as durable medical
equipment, radiology, physical therapy and occupational
therapy services, outpatient prescription drugs
and hospital inpatient and outpatient services.
Stark rules, therefore, are not generally an impediment
to anesthesiologists’ investments in ASCs.
Anesthesiologists do not refer patients to the ASC,
but pain medicine specialists may order outpatient
prescription drugs or physical therapy, and thus,
any payments that they receive from the ASC will
necessitate an exploration of applicable exceptions
to the prohibition (e.g., the personal services
exception may cover compensation for medical director
services). Note that many states have their own
physician self-referral laws that serious potential
investors must consult.
b. Antikickback law. Anesthesiologists’
ownership interests in ASCs clearly implicate the
federal antikickback statute. The antikickback law
is so broad on its face that virtually any form
of compensation or return on investment received
from an ASC would be illegal, so long as the parties
intended to reward the referral of Medicare, Medicaid
or other patients with federal health insurance.
For example sending a physician investor periodic
dividends could be construed as deliberately influencing
the physician to bring patients to the particular
ASC.
An essential element of a violation is that the
parties intend to encourage referrals.
If there is no intent to influence patient referrals,
or if the government cannot make a case that the
financial advantage conferred was intended to result
in referrals, there is no violation of the antikickback
law.
“Safe harbors” for a number of business
arrangements, codified in federal regulations, immunize
these arrangements from prosecution under the federal
antikickback law. Unlike fitting within a Stark
“exception,” meeting the requirements
for an antikickback safe harbor is a way to cut
short the investigation but is not a condition for
exoneration. Like the Stark exceptions, the antikickback
safe harbors define the terms under which personal
services contracts will be in the clear. Most of
these terms make sense intuitively; anesthesiologists
intending to invoke them should be careful to establish
that the compensation from the ASC is based on fair
market value.
There is a specific safe harbor for investments
in ASCs that may be of benefit to anesthesiologists
and pain medicine subspecialists who perform at
least one-third of their cases or procedures at
the ASC in which they have a financial investment.
(See
the “Practice Management” column in
the February 2000 issue of the NEWSLETTER
for more information on the terms of the ASC safe
harbor.) Many anesthesiologists,
however, do not satisfy that standard, since a single
ASC may represent a smaller proportion of their
caseload than one-third. It is worth repeating that,
absent the ability to refer patients, however, payments
from an ASC are not illegal under the antikickback
law.
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Judith
Jurin Semo, Esq., is with the law firm of Squire,
Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P., Washington, D.C.,
which serves as ASA’s outside legal counsel. |
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Karin
Bierstein, J.D., works with members and committees
on regulatory matters that affect practice management,
quality management and departmental administration,
and Medicare/Medicaid issues. |
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