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May 2006
Volume 70 |
Number 5 |
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Medicare, We Have a Fraud Problem
Karin Bierstein, J.D.
Associate Director of Professional Affairs
 This
article is available in PDF format.
ompliance with Medicare’s payment policies
is not always easy even with the best intentions.
Many of the rules that anesthesiologists must
follow in order to submit claims for payment have
very little to do with quality or efficiency.
They don’t even seem logical when applied
to certain scenarios: Why, for example, is it
legitimate to bill for a labor epidural while
one is medically directing a surgical case but
not for a postoperative pain epidural?
The point of this month’s column is not
to lead the way through the Medicare payment rules,
other than to remind readers that the objective
of the rules that particularly trouble anesthesiologists
is to prevent Medicare from paying you twice for
the same time. Working in the care team mode,
it may be safe for an anesthesiologist to perform
preoperative evaluations, for example, while supervising
the care of an anesthetized patient in an operating
room (O.R.) with an anesthesiologist assistant
30 feet away, but the Medicare system isn’t
about maximizing the number of services you can
provide simultaneously.
Rather, the point to be made here is that even
anesthesiology groups that diligently enforce
serious compliance programs may not be able to
avoid filing claims for more than the amount allowed
by Medicare. When the overbilling appears systematic
and more than a few hundred dollars are involved,
the practice needs to consider whether reporting
itself to the Department of Health and Human Services
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is the best
strategy. One large group in the Pacific Northwest
did successfully self-report last year and told
the story through a presentation by their chief
executive officer at the annual Medical Group
Management Association (MGMA) Anesthesia Administration
Assembly (AAA) meeting held in Tampa, Florida,
in March 2006. A summary follows.
Discovering the Error
As part of its billing compliance program, the
200-physician group had begun conducting internal
audits of its billing at 17 practice locations
in 2000. In 2001 the group developed its own audit
check list and trained its first physician compliance
officer. The role of this anesthesiologist was
to become critical in managing a major excess-billing
situation several years later: As a peer, he was
very effective in helping his fellow physicians
in the group make and implement difficult decisions.
In 2002 the internal audit process identified
Dr. X as an outlier. It appeared that he was reporting
an unusually large amount of time with patients
in the presurgical area. The audit was expanded
to determine the reason why. Dr. X would start
the anesthesia time clock running after he initially
saw a surgical patient in the O.R. suite and then
go to perform a pain medicine procedure on another
patient before inducing his first patient, all
the while running the anesthesia time clock on
the surgical case. This form of overbilling, we
should note, was particularly difficult to detect
because there were no concurrency issues, and
the pain procedure did not involve billed time.
The group continued to plow through information
and came to the conclusion that the systematic
billing for anesthesia time while Dr. X was performing
services for other patients was not a mere administrative
error. The overbilling seemed willful, and the
compliance team was forced to consider that it
might amount to fraud. Dr. X left the group and
hired his own legal counsel.
Choosing the ‘Voluntary Disclosure’
Option
Once a practice has determined that one or more
of its members may have committed Medicare fraud
(knowingly filing a false claim), damage control
becomes the issue. Is it a good idea to use the
OIG’s formal voluntary disclosure protocol?
If you do, and the overbilling has been intentional,
financial liability is certain. That is the only
guarantee — protection from disclosure is
a serious risk, since the practice’s information
is potentially available to the Department of
Justice and private litigants. A whistleblower,
for instance, might have access. Exclusion from
the Medicare and Medicaid programs is a possibility,
and even if the dollar loss would be tolerable,
loss of hospital privileges would not.
On the other hand, there are considerable advantages
to bringing the problem to the OIG. The group
described above felt first and foremost that going
to the OIG was the right thing to do. The group
also believed that the advantages outweighed the
risks and also that the government might uncover
the excess amounts billed without the group’s
help. The amount of the overbilling was large
($240,000 by agreement with the OIG), and it could
have triggered much greater penalties than the
$120,000 fine imposed. This was the minimum fine
that the OIG was permitted to collect, and it
reflected the group’s cooperation. It also
was covered by the group’s Errors and Omissions
insurance policy.
The group knew that it could show a strong commitment
to compliance based on the rigorous program that
it had had in place for several years, even though
one physician managed to avoid discovery for some
time. Both its existing program and its actions
and attitude throughout the OIG investigation
contributed to its ability to avoid the imposition
of a “Corporate Integrity Agreement”
(CIA), a very onerous, ongoing self-auditing and
reporting program mandated by the OIG to prevent
future instances of the form of fraud that gave
rise to the CIA.
Following the OIG’s “Provider Self-Disclosure
Protocol” is itself a serious commitment.
It begins with a letter to the Assistant Inspector
General for Investigative Operations describing
in some detail the problem being disclosed. It
involves an internal investigation that satisfies
OIG guidelines for spelling out the nature and
extent of the problem billing as well as the circumstances
of its discovery and the practice’s response.
The amount of overbilling must be estimated through
a self-assessment for which the practice submits
a work plan to the OIG, who will work with the
practice to define the sample design and estimation
methodology.
The group in question conducted its investigation
and financial self-assessment with guidance from
the OIG and as a result obtained a “Certificate
of Compliance” from the OIG — the
only provider ever to do so. The certificate required
1) continued implementation of the group’s
compliance program, 2) reporting and repayment
of overpayments made by federal governmental programs
and 3) continued cooperation with the OIG.
It is possible that the group’s attempts
to refund money to private payers for improper
claims submitted by Dr. X influenced the OIG not
to impose greater penalties. The Medicare authorities
cannot require physicians to follow Medicare payment
policies in doing business with private payers.
Any obligation to follow the Medicare concurrency
rules, for example, or to stop the clock if the
anesthesiologist engages in other activities while
providing an anesthesia service would have to
be in the participation contract between the anesthesiology
group and the payer. This group’s voluntary
efforts to make refunds to its private payers
— which did not even have a mechanism for
accepting the money — may nevertheless have
made a material difference to the outcome of the
investigation conducted with the OIG.
Joy Ketchum, the group’s CEO who spoke at
the Tampa meeting, noted that many of the anesthesiologists
expressed satisfaction at seeing that their investment
in a superb compliance program had paid off.
Lessons Learned by the Group
• Before there is any problem on
the horizon, have a good compliance program
in place, and document everything, including
the group anesthesiologists’ (and other
clinical and administrative staff’s) compliance
education. Spend the time to train a physician
auditor.
• In any focused audit, and especially
one that may lead to self-reporting to the OIG,
separate out the acts of the problem physician(s)
from those of the practice. The practice
wants the OIG to focus on its overall compliance
program and efforts. The physician may be seeking
vindication or otherwise inviting the OIG to
treat him or her as an adversary.
• Be prepared to find and pay for expert
legal advice. The group discussed in this
column spent $200,000 on lawyers and $60,000
on its internal audit, not including hundreds
of hours of staff time. The actual costs were
this high even though the group was sophisticated
enough to realize the perils of trying to reinvent
the wheel, as shown in one of Ms. Ketchum’s
slides:
• “There are many cases available
for review, which are publicly listed, with
similar enough fact patterns that the path
to resolution should be fairly clear.
• “Do not allow professional advisors
to fritter away your time or your resources
with ‘new’ approaches to these
regulatory interactions.”
The voluntary reporting protocol is not simple,
and there may be other parties to whom the practice
owes refunds. Involve experienced legal counsel
from the beginning. They can help you to make
an informed decision whether to talk to the OIG,
and ideally they are on good enough terms with
prosecutors to seek their informal opinions on
whether and where the practice should report its
own possible violations, without revealing the
identity of the practice.
Concluding the presentation, Ms. Ketchum added
some overall strategic advice:
• Always tell the full
truth.
• Act on your initiative to both find your
problems and design a plan of corrective action.
• Execute your plan and be serious about
it.
• Be prepared to be fully cooperative …
no time for games.
That said, we hope that you will never need to
refer back to this column.
| OIG Is Interested
in ‘Visits’ Billed as ‘Consultations’ |
Anesthesiologists are accustomed to
thinking of their evaluation and management
services to patients as “consults.”
There are important differences, however,
in that consults pay more and also require
more, i.e., a report back to the referring
physician as opposed to simple acceptance
of a patient referred for treatment.
Knowing when to bill a visit rather
than a consult is of particular importance
to physicians performing pain medicine
services. For details, see <www.ASAhq.org/Newsletters/1999/
02_99/PractMgmt_0299.html>.
(ASA NEWSLETTER. 1999; 63(2):27-28).
According to a recent review of a random
400-case sample, the OIG found that,
in 2001, Medicare allowed $1.1 billion
in improper payments for services billed
as consultations. That means about 75
percent of services billed as consultations
did not meet all applicable program
requirements.
The OIG states that because in 2001
reimbursement for follow-up inpatient
consultations was lower than other types,
it is likely that many of these billing
errors were unintentional. Still, because
of this significant discrepancy, they
have placed the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services on alert to
educate physicians about the billing
requirements for all types and levels
of consultations.
See the OIG’s full report, Consultations
in Medicare: Coding and Reimbursement
(OEI-09-02-00030), at <www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-02-00030.pdf>. |
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