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ASA NEWSLETTER
 
 
May 2006
Volume 70
Number 5

Practice Management


Medicare, We Have a Fraud Problem


Karin Bierstein, J.D.
Associate Director of Professional Affairs



This article is available in PDF format.



ompliance with Medicare’s payment policies is not always easy even with the best intentions. Many of the rules that anesthesiologists must follow in order to submit claims for payment have very little to do with quality or efficiency. They don’t even seem logical when applied to certain scenarios: Why, for example, is it legitimate to bill for a labor epidural while one is medically directing a surgical case but not for a postoperative pain epidural?

The point of this month’s column is not to lead the way through the Medicare payment rules, other than to remind readers that the objective of the rules that particularly trouble anesthesiologists is to prevent Medicare from paying you twice for the same time. Working in the care team mode, it may be safe for an anesthesiologist to perform preoperative evaluations, for example, while supervising the care of an anesthetized patient in an operating room (O.R.) with an anesthesiologist assistant 30 feet away, but the Medicare system isn’t about maximizing the number of services you can provide simultaneously.

Rather, the point to be made here is that even anesthesiology groups that diligently enforce serious compliance programs may not be able to avoid filing claims for more than the amount allowed by Medicare. When the overbilling appears systematic and more than a few hundred dollars are involved, the practice needs to consider whether reporting itself to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is the best strategy. One large group in the Pacific Northwest did successfully self-report last year and told the story through a presentation by their chief executive officer at the annual Medical Group Management Association (MGMA) Anesthesia Administration Assembly (AAA) meeting held in Tampa, Florida, in March 2006. A summary follows.

Discovering the Error

As part of its billing compliance program, the 200-physician group had begun conducting internal audits of its billing at 17 practice locations in 2000. In 2001 the group developed its own audit check list and trained its first physician compliance officer. The role of this anesthesiologist was to become critical in managing a major excess-billing situation several years later: As a peer, he was very effective in helping his fellow physicians in the group make and implement difficult decisions.

In 2002 the internal audit process identified Dr. X as an outlier. It appeared that he was reporting an unusually large amount of time with patients in the presurgical area. The audit was expanded to determine the reason why. Dr. X would start the anesthesia time clock running after he initially saw a surgical patient in the O.R. suite and then go to perform a pain medicine procedure on another patient before inducing his first patient, all the while running the anesthesia time clock on the surgical case. This form of overbilling, we should note, was particularly difficult to detect because there were no concurrency issues, and the pain procedure did not involve billed time.

The group continued to plow through information and came to the conclusion that the systematic billing for anesthesia time while Dr. X was performing services for other patients was not a mere administrative error. The overbilling seemed willful, and the compliance team was forced to consider that it might amount to fraud. Dr. X left the group and hired his own legal counsel.

Choosing the ‘Voluntary Disclosure’ Option

Once a practice has determined that one or more of its members may have committed Medicare fraud (knowingly filing a false claim), damage control becomes the issue. Is it a good idea to use the OIG’s formal voluntary disclosure protocol? If you do, and the overbilling has been intentional, financial liability is certain. That is the only guarantee — protection from disclosure is a serious risk, since the practice’s information is potentially available to the Department of Justice and private litigants. A whistleblower, for instance, might have access. Exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid programs is a possibility, and even if the dollar loss would be tolerable, loss of hospital privileges would not.

On the other hand, there are considerable advantages to bringing the problem to the OIG. The group described above felt first and foremost that going to the OIG was the right thing to do. The group also believed that the advantages outweighed the risks and also that the government might uncover the excess amounts billed without the group’s help. The amount of the overbilling was large ($240,000 by agreement with the OIG), and it could have triggered much greater penalties than the $120,000 fine imposed. This was the minimum fine that the OIG was permitted to collect, and it reflected the group’s cooperation. It also was covered by the group’s Errors and Omissions insurance policy.

The group knew that it could show a strong commitment to compliance based on the rigorous program that it had had in place for several years, even though one physician managed to avoid discovery for some time. Both its existing program and its actions and attitude throughout the OIG investigation contributed to its ability to avoid the imposition of a “Corporate Integrity Agreement” (CIA), a very onerous, ongoing self-auditing and reporting program mandated by the OIG to prevent future instances of the form of fraud that gave rise to the CIA.

Following the OIG’s “Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol” is itself a serious commitment. It begins with a letter to the Assistant Inspector General for Investigative Operations describing in some detail the problem being disclosed. It involves an internal investigation that satisfies OIG guidelines for spelling out the nature and extent of the problem billing as well as the circumstances of its discovery and the practice’s response. The amount of overbilling must be estimated through a self-assessment for which the practice submits a work plan to the OIG, who will work with the practice to define the sample design and estimation methodology.

The group in question conducted its investigation and financial self-assessment with guidance from the OIG and as a result obtained a “Certificate of Compliance” from the OIG — the only provider ever to do so. The certificate required 1) continued implementation of the group’s compliance program, 2) reporting and repayment of overpayments made by federal governmental programs and 3) continued cooperation with the OIG.

It is possible that the group’s attempts to refund money to private payers for improper claims submitted by Dr. X influenced the OIG not to impose greater penalties. The Medicare authorities cannot require physicians to follow Medicare payment policies in doing business with private payers. Any obligation to follow the Medicare concurrency rules, for example, or to stop the clock if the anesthesiologist engages in other activities while providing an anesthesia service would have to be in the participation contract between the anesthesiology group and the payer. This group’s voluntary efforts to make refunds to its private payers — which did not even have a mechanism for accepting the money — may nevertheless have made a material difference to the outcome of the investigation conducted with the OIG.

Joy Ketchum, the group’s CEO who spoke at the Tampa meeting, noted that many of the anesthesiologists expressed satisfaction at seeing that their investment in a superb compliance program had paid off.

Lessons Learned by the Group

• Before there is any problem on the horizon, have a good compliance program in place, and document everything, including the group anesthesiologists’ (and other clinical and administrative staff’s) compliance education. Spend the time to train a physician auditor.

• In any focused audit, and especially one that may lead to self-reporting to the OIG, separate out the acts of the problem physician(s) from those of the practice. The practice wants the OIG to focus on its overall compliance program and efforts. The physician may be seeking vindication or otherwise inviting the OIG to treat him or her as an adversary.

• Be prepared to find and pay for expert legal advice.
The group discussed in this column spent $200,000 on lawyers and $60,000 on its internal audit, not including hundreds of hours of staff time. The actual costs were this high even though the group was sophisticated enough to realize the perils of trying to reinvent the wheel, as shown in one of Ms. Ketchum’s slides:

• “There are many cases available for review, which are publicly listed, with similar enough fact patterns that the path to resolution should be fairly clear.

• “Do not allow professional advisors to fritter away your time or your resources with ‘new’ approaches to these regulatory interactions.”

The voluntary reporting protocol is not simple, and there may be other parties to whom the practice owes refunds. Involve experienced legal counsel from the beginning. They can help you to make an informed decision whether to talk to the OIG, and ideally they are on good enough terms with prosecutors to seek their informal opinions on whether and where the practice should report its own possible violations, without revealing the identity of the practice.

Concluding the presentation, Ms. Ketchum added some overall strategic advice:

• Always tell the full truth.

• Act on your initiative to both find your problems and design a plan of corrective action.

• Execute your plan and be serious about it.

• Be prepared to be fully cooperative … no time for games.

That said, we hope that you will never need to refer back to this column.

OIG Is Interested in ‘Visits’ Billed as ‘Consultations’
Anesthesiologists are accustomed to thinking of their evaluation and management services to patients as “consults.” There are important differences, however, in that consults pay more and also require more, i.e., a report back to the referring physician as opposed to simple acceptance of a patient referred for treatment. Knowing when to bill a visit rather than a consult is of particular importance to physicians performing pain medicine services. For details, see <www.ASAhq.org/Newsletters/1999/ 02_99/PractMgmt_0299.html>. (ASA NEWSLETTER. 1999; 63(2):27-28).

According to a recent review of a random 400-case sample, the OIG found that, in 2001, Medicare allowed $1.1 billion in improper payments for services billed as consultations. That means about 75 percent of services billed as consultations did not meet all applicable program requirements.

The OIG states that because in 2001 reimbursement for follow-up inpatient consultations was lower than other types, it is likely that many of these billing errors were unintentional. Still, because of this significant discrepancy, they have placed the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services on alert to educate physicians about the billing requirements for all types and levels of consultations.

See the OIG’s full report, Consultations in Medicare: Coding and Reimbursement (OEI-09-02-00030), at <www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-02-00030.pdf>.
Source Material:
• OIG’s Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol. 63 Fed Reg 58399 (October 30, 1998), <www.ASAhq.org/Washington/selfdisclosure.pdf>. (accessed 4/21/06)



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The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent or reflect the views, policies or actions of the American Society of Anesthesiologists.

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