y
first semester as the ASA Lansdale Public Policy
Fellow seemed very much like being a student at
one of the nation’s largest graduate schools.
There are several hundred congressional fellows.
Most are individuals with established careers and
areas of expertise. All are here to observe and
learn about the congressional process in Washington.
Some are scientists working through the American
Association for the Advancement of Science. Others
are educators working through the American Political
Science Association. The uniformed services, federal
agencies and national laboratories also provide
fellowship opportunities for individuals entering
senior management positions. Fellows obtain assignments
as staff to offices of members or to committees
of the House of Representatives or Senate. Many
fellows work in areas of their expertise; others
prefer to explore new roles. Most conclude that
the opportunity to understand how the system works
is similar whether or not they work in areas of
their personal expertise.
The educational process might be considered participatory
case studies. Fellows work with current issues under
congressional consideration. The educational resources
are electronic media and the excellent documents
and research provided through the Library of Congress
and the Congressional Research Service. In addition
there are frequent seminars in the form of committee
hearings and informational briefings. There also
is an ongoing curriculum of lectures on procedural
and policy issues conducted throughout the year
by the Congressional Research Service staff.
Initially I was fortunate to obtain a position on
the staff of the House Policy Committee <policy.house.gov/html/about.cfm>.
The committee was chaired by Rep. John B. Shadegg
(R-AZ). I was assigned the areas of health care,
science and veterans affairs. The function of the
committee staff is to obtain information for presentation
to the members of Congress who serve on the committee.
The information that the staff assembles is provided
to the members in the form of oral and written briefings.
These materials are supplemented by weekly presentations
by invited guests.
Areas of health care policy considered by the committee
included the Medicare prescription drug program,
Medicare physician payment, health care information
technology development, avian influenza and policy
issues surrounding vaccine and antiviral development.
Policy committee speakers included Mark McClellan,
M.D., Administrator of the Centers for Medicare
& Medicaid Services, David J. Brailer, M.D.,
Ph.D., National Coordinator for Health Information
Technology, and Julie Gerberding, M.D., Director
of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
During fall 2005, two events occupied the majority
of my efforts, the federal response to Hurricane
Katrina and preparation for pandemic influenza.
I also had the opportunity to research and prepare
a committee publication: “Homeward Bound —
Long-Term Care Needs of Returning Veterans”
<policy.house.gov/files/homewardbound.pdf>.
During the month of September, documenting the federal
response to Katrina and analyzing the policy implications
consumed much of the policy committee staff’s
efforts. The final report of the Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina, “A Failure
of Initiative” <www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html>
and Frances F. Townsend’s report, “The
Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned”
<www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned>,
summarize observations and conclusions reached by
the policy committee staff and other larger committees
and working groups.
My focus, public health preparedness, began with
Hurricane Katrina. Initially I documented events
as they occurred during and following the hurricane.
Subsequently I had the opportunity to observe congressional
analysis of the response through House and Senate
oversight hearings. The report by the Congressional
Research Service, “2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes:
The Public Health and Medical Response,” summarizes
many of the problems that were identified <www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL33096.pdf>.
During September I met with Admiral John Eisold,
M.D., the attending physician to Congress and former
Robert Wood Johnson Health Policy Fellow. Based
on his perspective of the emerging threat of an
avian influenza pandemic, he suggested that this
issue would provide a unique opportunity to study
the role of congress in the development of public
health policy.
On November 1, 2005, President George W. Bush announced
the “National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
Preparedness” and requested an emergency supplemental
budget of $6.7 billion <www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/nspi.pdf>.
Prior to the announcement, the Executive Branch
had undertaken a thorough assessment of the threat
of the H5N1 avian flu virus evolving to a readily
transmissible, highly pathogenic strain capable
of producing a worldwide human pandemic similar
to the influenza pandemic of 1918. The global and
national health risks and the risks to global and
national security as well as the potential for economic
and infrastructure disruption were understood and
concurred with by most experts.
In order to provide Congress with an understanding
of the analysis that the Executive Branch had completed,
and to justify the level of funding requested, a
series of congressional briefings and hearings were
held. National and international experts in infectious
disease and global economics were included in these
sessions. Frequently the material was tailored to
the specific areas of responsibility of the committee
of jurisdiction. Within a period of six weeks, the
basic science of the virology, enzootic disease
transmission, immunology and pathology was presented
along with the national and international plans
for surveillance and detection. The current status
of international and national public health preparedness
and the likely inability to accomplish containment
was conveyed. In addition the health, security and
economic risks were explained. Because of the scientific
complexity of the explanation of the possible evolution
from avian to human disease, the current status
of vaccine and antiviral development and the multilevel
risks associated with a human pandemic, many small
group briefings were necessary. These briefings
offered the challenge of making scientific concepts
understandable to individuals with a limited scientific
background.
The hearing process clarified the multilevel complexity
of the pandemic threat and risks. Nationally two
major areas of concern emerged. One is the lack
of adequate supplies of vaccine and antiviral drugs.
The second is our current low level of national,
regional and local public health preparedness.
Congress carefully evaluated the public health response
to Katrina and the proposed plan for the response
to a potential pandemic. It debated realignment
of the national defense medical system from within
the Department of Homeland Security to the Department
of Health and Human Services and clarified its role
in the national response plan. It also clarified
and strengthened the role of the Public Health Service
Medical Reserve Corps within the preparedness directorate
of the Department of Homeland Security. Congress
responded to the president’s request for funding
for pandemic preparedness by appropriating an initial
installment of $3.8 billion to increase international
surveillance and detection, to increase vaccine
and antiviral drug development and production and
also to fund increased public health preparedness.
Legislatively, Congress reduced product liability
to encourage the pharmaceutical industry to become
more active in vaccine and antiviral drug development
and production.
Based on lessons learned from the response to Hurricane
Katrina, Congress encouraged and supported efforts
to more actively involve states and local governments
in public health preparedness planning.
During the first semester of my fellowship, I had
the opportunity to observe and participate in the
significant role that Congress plays in public health
preparedness. The congressional approach to public
health preparedness following Hurricane Katrina
and in response to the threat of pandemic influenza
demonstrated an example of the processes of fact-finding,
oversight investigation, policy formulation, regulation
and authorization, and funding used by Congress.
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William
G. Horton, M.D., is Clinical Professor of Anesthesiology,
University of Washington, and Emeritus Physician,
Virginia Mason Clinic, Seattle, Washington. |
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