ay
for performance (P4P) programs propose to link payment
rates to evidence of achievement of specific quality
care indicators. This initiative grew out of the
1999 Institute of Medicine (IOM) report To Err
Is Human and the resultant paradigms of care
improvement embraced by the Leapfrog Group, the
Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) and others.
Advocates for P4P believe that it will improve quality
of care.1
Furthermore, this strategy is seen as a means of
saving money as it rewards efficiency and substitutes
payment for quality in place of payment linked solely
to volume of services provided.2
This type of program has been extant in some private
payer arrangements, and primary care has now seen
the initiation of these policies by federal and
state payers as well. The Integrated Healthcare
Association (IHA) began its P4P program in 2001.3
Other payers have begun “pay for participation”
programs in which practitioners and facilities can
receive payment by simply sharing outcome data rather
than by hitting a particular quality “mark.”4
This has culminated with Medicare’s Physician
Quality Reporting Initiative (PQRI), which began
on July 1, 2007.
The incentives that have been discussed usually
range from 1 percent to 5 percent of a physician’s
total revenue.5
Providing more money has increased quality in specific
markets, but pay for performance is very early in
its evaluation.6
One of the lessons learned at IHA is that larger
amounts of payment will induce more rapid and widespread
compliance with the program objectives. As a result,
it has instituted an increase in its bonus program
that will reach as high as 10 percent by the end
of the decade, up from an initial 1.5 percent. Some
postulate that incentives as high as 20 percent
will be necessary to effect quality improvement.
It must be remembered that these are “holdbacks”
and that the rewards of these programs will be extracted
from the payments of those who do not meet P4P targets
or have none.7
In the case of PQRI, Medicare offers physicians
a bonus payment of up to 1.5 percent of their 2007
charges (subject to a cap) for reporting on a designated
set of 74 quality measures.8
Specialty societies have been invited to provide
recommendations for appropriate measures of quality
to be used in the production of P4P programs by
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS). Coordinated through the American Medical
Association (AMA) Physician Consortium for Performance
Improvement (PCPI), AMA has invested more than $5
million in development of 140 measures,9
the first half of which became part of Medicare’s
2007 PQRI system on July 1, 2007.10
Medicare is required by law to have measures adopted
or endorsed by a consensus organization such as
the AQA Alliance (formally the Ambulatory Care Quality
Alliance) or the National Quality Forum. This has
slowed the approval process.
Measures for P4P can be outcome —
assess the quality of care to the extent that health
care services influence the likelihood of the desired
outcome; process — assess adherence
to recommendations for clinical practice based upon
evidence or consensus; or structural —
describe the capability of the professional rather
than care provided or results achieved (e.g., a
nurse/patient ratio is a structural measure).11
The types of measures advocated for use in P4P programs
should generally meet the following 10 criteria:12
• High volume: the diagnoses
involved must be relatively common.
• Gravity: the conditions
that are to be affected must be significant.
• Empirical evidence: process
and structural measures may rest upon empirical
evidence, but outcome measures require the more
rigorous test of randomized, controlled trials
in the peer-reviewed literature.
• Gap: there must be evidence
that a significant difference exists between the
current practice and the best practice.
• Probability: there must
be likelihood that the intervention being promulgated
will improve the outcomes as desired.
• Reliability: the measure
(or “metric”) is consistent when measured
by various observers, at various points in time,
and in various settings.
• Validity: the metric
is proven to actually measure its intended endpoint,
and it is clearly defined so as not to be left
open to interpretation by various stakeholders.
• Feasibility: there must
be a way to efficiently obtain the measurement.
• Acceptance/approval:
the metric should have been identified by such
quality measurement organizations as the National
Quality Forum, the AMA PCPI, the National Committee
on Quality Assurance or by CMS itself.
• Applicability in several settings:
there must be utility of the metric in many practice
settings, ideally ranging from the single-practitioner
office to major medical centers.
The ASA Administrative Council, directors and members
of the committees on Performance and Outcomes Measurement,
Economics, Critical Care Medicine, Pain Medicine,
and Ambulatory Surgical Care have all been active
in the process of evaluating quality measurements
to meet the above criteria. This will be an area
of dynamic activity for some time to come and will
continue to deserve this high level of ASA organizational
attention. Members are encouraged to report any
activity in this regard among private payers to
the chairs of these committees or to ASA Vice-President
for Professional Affairs Robert E. Johnstone, M.D.
References:
1. Epstein AM, Lee TH, Hamel MB. Paying physicians
for high-quality care. N Engl J Med. 2004;
350:406-410.
2. Hackbarth GM. Medicare payment to physicians.
Statement before the Subcommittee on Health, Comm
on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives;
November 17, 2005. www.MedPAC.gov/search/searchframes.cfm.
3. Integrated Healthcare Association. www.iha.org.
4. Birkmeyer NJO, Birkmeyer JD. Strategies for improving
surgical quality — should payers reward excellence
or effort? N Engl J Med. 2006; 354:864-870.
5. Strunk B, Hurley R. Paying for quality: Health
plans try carrots instead of sticks. HSC Brief No.
82, May 2004. Via PubMed: PMID: 15151134.
6. Grabowski DC, Angelelli JL. The relationship
of Medicaid payment rates, bed constraint policies,
and risk-adjusted pressure ulcers. Health Serv
Res. 2004; 39:793-812.
7. Milgate K, Cheng SB. Pay-for-performance: The
MedPAC perspective. Health Aff. 2006; 25:413-419.
8. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, MLN
Matters Number MM5558, March 9, 2007. www.cms.hhs.gov/MLNMattersArticles/downloads/MM5558.pdf.
Accessed on July 28, 2007.
9. www.asa-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2946.html.
10. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
Coding for Quality: A Handbook for PQRI Participation
June 18, 2007. www.cms.hhs.gov/PQRI/Downloads/PQRI_Coding_for_Quality_Handbook.pdf.
Accessed on July 8, 2007.
11. Stead SW, Pay for Performance: How Anesthesiology
Can Participate, 2006 Practice Management Meeting,
February 2006.
12. Bierstein K. Pay for Performance in Ambulatory
Anesthesia. SAMBA Annual Meeting May 2006.
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Douglas
G. Merrill, M.D., is Medical Director, Ambulatory
Surgery, and Professor, Anesthesia, Carver College
of Medicine, University of Iowa, Iowa City,
Iowa. |
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Steven
L. Sween, M.D., is Chair, Department of Anesthesia,
Saint Joseph’s Hospital of Atlanta, Atlanta,
Georgia. |
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Stanley
W. Stead, M.D., M.B.A., is CEO, Stead Health
Group, Inc., and Clinical Professor of Anesthesia
and Pain Management, University of California-Davis,
Encino, California. |
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